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Abstract
The concept of the pivot, whereby a new venture
alters its offering or business model, is standard
practice among new ventures seeking to validate their
value proposition in uncertain markets. Whereas a new
venture begins with a business model driven by the
entrepreneur’s perception of the market, pivots driven
by market feedback align the venture with market need.
However, we argue that executing too many pivots can
adversely affect firm performance by postponing the
maturation of the firm. Using change in a venture’s
NAICS code as a proxy for pivoting, we show an
inverted-U relationship between revenue and the
number of pivots among Kauffman Firm Survey
participants. This longitudinal empirical study is one of
the first on the relationship between pivoting and
performance. It aims to attract attention to this
important topic of entrepreneurship, and help the
entrepreneur facing the difficult decision of whether or
not she should pivot.

1. Introduction
Entrepreneurs managing high degrees of uncertainty
are often faced with the choice of staying committed to
their original business model or pursuing a new
direction. There are two ways entrepreneurs can change
direction. They can learn and change incrementally by
varying a single element of their business model.
Alternatively, they can make a radical change to their
strategy by changing multiple elements of their business
model [1]. The decision to continue with the current
strategy or pivot away from it is one of the hardest
decisions that entrepreneurs will face [2].
The term “pivot” has become part of the everyday
language of entrepreneurs and those who advise and
fund them. It was first coined in 2009 [3] and is defined
as “a structured course correction designed to test a new
fundamental hypothesis” [2] (pg 149). Although the
term is relatively new, it is closely related to the concept
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of business model innovation in that it defines a broad
range of change related behaviors.
Pivoting is promoted and celebrated in the
entrepreneurship literature with anecdotes often told of
successful pivots. For example, Groupon began as a dogood site called The Point, PayPal started as
cryptography libraries for Palm Pilot devices, YouTube
started as a video-dating site, and Twitter began as a
platform to subscribe to podcasts [4].
There are many reasons an entrepreneur would
decide to pivot. Clearly, staying with a business idea that
is not working could have severe consequences,
particularly for a start-up which is often focused on a
single project. Project failure in this case can put the
entrepreneur out of business. Questioning initial lowpotential business models and refining them helps
entrepreneurs discover and assess multiple alternatives,
gather valuable information, and make better decisions
[5]. Failure followed by pivoting is often treated
positively as a validated learning process [2, 3].
Research has also found that business model viability is
greatly improved by business model experimentation.
For example, pivoting is the most frequently occurring
commonality among different successful startups [2]
and committing too early to a specific business model
can have negative effects on long-term survival and
performance [1].
However, pivoting is not a guarantee for success
especially when changing direction can consume
resources and move entrepreneurs away from
competencies. For example, as entrepreneurs build their
businesses they become increasingly knowledgeable in
the associated processes, technologies and markets.
They may lose that expertise during a pivot resulting in
lost time and resources [6].
The importance of pivoting to entrepreneurs
deserves research attention and currently there is a gap
in our understanding. Prior work tends to be conceptual
[7-9], qualitative [1, 10], or quantitative in the context
of established firms [11, 12]. Nascent research on
startup pivots focus on antecedents, i.e. what triggers a
pivot, such as feedback, entrepreneur characteristics,
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environmental factors, or investment [6, 13, 14]. In
general, existing research and knowledge on pivots is
limited and there has been a call for better understanding
of business model development in new venutres [5, 13].
This study fills the research gap in a number of ways.
First, we use the Kauffman Firm Survey longitudinal
dataset to empirically investigate the relationship
between startup success and its pivot activity. Second,
recent studies of pivot activities [13, 14] noted that often
a firm engages in multiple pivots. Given the fact that
pivots can redirect a failing business model but at the
same time consume scarce resources, we investigate if
there is a threshold to the number of pivots a firm can
make after which pivots become detrimental to
performance. Finally, while research on startup pivots
is generally done in the context of high-technology we
study the moderating effect of high-tech versus low-tech
startups. Frequent testing, tweaking and pivoting may
be viable for websites, apps, or other digital products
that can be addressed by coding changes but not
traditional manufactured goods.
Entrepreneurs need to be persistent when facing
adversity and skepticism. However they must also be
flexible enough to leave behind some of the ideas in
which they invested, and explore different opportunities
[6]. To the best of the authors knowledge, this study is
the first of its kind to address the issue of successive
pivoting, product type, and startup survival.

2. Framework and Hypotheses
Pivot is a recent term and literature definitions
include phrases such as “change course”, “shift in
strategy”, or “adapting the business model”. In other
words, pivot is often considered synonymous with
change. More specifically, it is considered as validating
a hypothesis related to a business model [2, 15] and is
often considered the path entrepreneurs must take when
looking for the correct strategy.
Ries [2] offers ten different types of pivots that
startups can make such as pivots based on product,
customer segment and need, platform, business
architecture, value, engine of growth, channel, and
technology. In a study of the software industry, the most
common external trigger of a pivot was negative
customer reaction, and the most common internal
trigger of a pivot was a flawed business model [13].
Some pivots can be incremental where a small
element of the product, service, or business model is
changed. Other pivots can be radical where significant
and possibly multiple elements of the business model
are changed [1]. While it is often argued that successful
startups must make multiple pivots [16] and pivots are
often used in a continuous process of validating

hypotheses, the focus of this study is not incremental
change. Instead, our focus is on radical pivots that are
so significant they cause a change in the startup’s North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
code. For example, Android began as an operating
system for cameras and pivoted to the smartphone
industry. Flickr was a role playing game that pivoted to
a photo sharing service [13].
Like continuous
incremental change, radical pivots can lead to long term
growth, but unlike continuous incremental change,
radical pivots are disruptive to the startup and are not as
well understood [1].
Startups are under conflicting pressure to cut losses
and execute changes rapidly, or stay the course and give
its business model time to succeed and attain legitimacy.
Cutting losses and making changes, i.e. choosing to
pivot, is often intuitive. Staying with a business model
when there are negative responses from customers,
unanticipated competitive pressures, or technical
challenges can lead to business failure. Using new
information reduces uncertainty and helps firms find
better business opportunities. Startups often need to
make multiple pivots. For example, MishGuru began as
a company that let users design and print their own
horseshoes. This idea was not scalable because horse
owners were not conducive to rapid growth. They
pivoted to a collaborative video making site and finally
ended up as a successful content management system
for SnapChat. RetentionScience initially provided
independent artists a platform where they could promote
niche brands and products via social media. This
business model proved not to be scalable so it pivoted to
providing a social media-based analytics and referral
platform for e-commerce businesses. However, because
they encountered many well-funded competitors
working in the same area, they pivoted again towards a
retention automation platform that makes AI accessible
to business clients.
Despite the reasons for pivoting, there are also many
reasons a startup may decide to persevere and stay the
course. Focused commitment to the original business
plan can positively impact initial growth [1] because
entrepreneurs learn quickly about technical and market
issues while staying ahead of competitors.
As
entrepreneurs build their businesses, they become
experts on associated processes, technologies, and
markets. In such cases, expertise that has taken time and
resources to develop can be lost with a radical pivot. In
other cases, the business model is valid but requires
longer time to achieve milestones like the first paying
customer, revenue, or profit. Furthermore, having one
clear value proposition for stakeholders allows a firm to
better attract strategic partners and valuable employees
[1]. Pivots can harm an entrepreneur’s and creative
employees’ ownership of their original idea thereby
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undermining any attempts at change [17]. It would also
mean changing the mindset of all stakeholders,
specialized employees, organizational structures, and
dealing with missing competencies.
Staying the course also avoids some of the hazards
of successive pivoting. One study found that firms can
have considerable difficulties in mobilizing
stakeholders and additional resources for subsequent
pivots leading to bankruptcy in several cases [1].
Investors are not always supportive of continued change
and refrain from injecting large amounts of capital until
progress has been made. Successive radical pivots can
also weaken investor commitment because they begin to
question whether the business model was wrong or the
problem lies with the entrepreneurs [18].
Staged models of new venture evolution [19],
including the “Valley of Death” model [20, 21], predict
that firms initially endure a period of time with no
revenue while they validate their value proposition,
pivoting when necessary. This pre-revenue period is
followed by a post-revenue period with some initial
sales that validate the value proposition, but are
insufficient to cover expenses. During this post-revenue
pre-break-even period, ventures change their focus from
innovation to operational efficiency in order to achieve
profitability (the third period). The pivoting activity of
startups occurs primarily in the first phase, where
success is measured by revenue, not profit.
Consequently, we use revenue as a measure of pivot
success.
Given the conflicting pressure to pivot and
persevere, we hypothesize that the value of pivoting will
initially grow with each change but eventually diminish
as redefining the business model becomes more costly
or as resources run dry, leading to an inverted-U
relationship between firm performance and the number
of pivots:
H1: The revenue of a new venture exhibits an
inverted-U relationship with the number of pivots.
An entrepreneur’s need to pivot most commonly
originates from mistaken assumptions of the target
market and, by extension, the new venture’s value
proposition. The uncertainty of markets and value
propositions is characteristically higher in the high tech
startup domain than in general. Consequently, the need
for pivots to disambiguate this uncertainty is even more
critical in the high tech startup domain. While pivoting
in software based industries is most often researched
and celebrated, it is also possible in more traditional
industries. However, while testing and tweaking of
websites and apps is often done by simply modifying
code, pivoting in other sectors is generally considered to

be much more difficult, see [22, 23]. For these reasons,
we hypothesize:
H2: The relationship between revenue and pivots is
different between high-tech firms and low-tech firms.

3. Methods and Data
In this study, we consider a pivot to be a significant
change in a firm’s business model, as opposed to an
incremental change such as altering a feature in a firm’s
product or service. Because a change to a firm’s North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code
would indicate such a significant change, we use a
change in the NAICS code to reflect a pivot. Moreover,
we represent revenue as a binary variable and not as a
continuous variable for two reasons. First, the success
of pivoting is not so much the amount of revenue but the
existence of any which in turn reflects business model
validation. Second, revenue varies by orders of
magnitude between industries, and we seek to control
for this variance.
This study uses the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) of
4928 companies founded in 2004 and surveyed annually
from 2004 to 2011 [24]. The KFS collects information
about each participating firm’s business characteristics,
strategy and innovation, business organization and
human resource benefits, business finances, work
behavior, and ownership and demographics of its active
owner and operators. Specifically, the study uses the
confidential longitudinal long-format KFS dataset
(KFS8_L_L1) hosted by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) Data Enclave for the Kauffman
Foundation [25]. Unlike the public version of the KFS
which provides only the leftmost two digits of each
firm’s NAICS code (i.e., the firm’s sector code), the
confidential dataset provides all six digits, enabling the
study to detect more subtle pivots that impact the less
significant digits.
Because the KFS collects data once a year, we can
detect one change annually in a firm’s NAICS code, and
the response to the question: “In calendar year [20XX],
did [BUSINESS NAME] receive any revenue from the
sales of goods, services, or intellectual property?” for
each year between 2004 and 2011 inclusive. Thus, for
each year we have the revenue status of the surviving
responding startups, and can compute the total number
of pivots (NAICS code changes) that preceded that
revenue status. The KFS also reports if each participant,
at each year, considered itself to be a high-tech firm or
not.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the KFS
data employed in the study viewed per year. It shows
the typical exponential decrease in surviving firms, and

Page 5451

that firms in general pivot (radically) early in their
lifecycle. There are no pivots detected in 2004 because
that is the first year of the KFS.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the KFS
data employed in the study viewed per number of pivots.
It indicates a non-linear relationship between the odds

of revenue at any particular year, and the number of
pivots the startup executed up to and including that year.
An inverted-U relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 by
the quadratic trendline of revenue versus number of
pivots, which is more pronounced among high-tech
firms.

Table 1. Summary statistics of survivorship and pivot activity.

Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Surviving
Firms
417
377
310
272
264
249
235
216

High Tech
Pivots/Year
0.00%
23.87%
20.97%
4.78%
10.98%
0.80%
2.98%
1.85%

Cumulative
Pivots/Firm
0.00
0.24
0.40
0.43
0.59
0.59
0.66
0.64

Surviving
Firms
2723
2407
2158
1932
1767
1627
1499
1401

Low Tech
Pivots/Year
0.00%
24.18%
24.42%
8.44%
8.77%
4.06%
3.40%
3.28%

Cumulative
Pivots/Firm
0.00
0.24
0.49
0.57
0.64
0.69
0.71
0.75

Table 2. Summary statistics of pivot and revenue performance.
# of Pivots
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Total
1782
234
283
23
13
2

High Tech Startup Years
No Revenue
Revenue
318
1464
49
185
44
239
4
19
7
6
2

% Revenue
82.2
79.1
84.4
82.6
46.1
0

Total
11088
2015
2059
178
57
32
4

Low Tech Startup Years
No Revenue
Revenue
2376
8712
393
1622
333
1726
21
157
9
48
8
24
4

% Revenue
78.6
80.5
83.8
88.2
84.2
75
100

2
�
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒 logit = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡

where βi is the i’th order coefficient of the logit, and pj,t
is the number of changes to NAICS code (i.e. pivots) the
firm has reported since its inception up to and including
year t.

4. Results

Figure 1. Trend lines of revenue vs. pivots.

To test the hypotheses, we model revenue as a binary
outcome and perform a quadratic logistic regression,
using the number of pivots and the number of pivots
squared as covariates. The odds ratio of a firm j
achieving revenue in year t is thus modeled as

Table 3 presents the results of the quadratic logistic
regression of achieving revenue over number of pivots.
In all cases (high tech, low tech, and combined), the
coefficient of the second order term is negative,
indicating an inverted-U relationship. The magnitude of
the second order coefficient is greater among high tech
firms, indicating that revenue is more sensitive to
pivoting (the steepness of the curve in Figure 2 is
greater) among high tech firms than among low tech
firms. The two hypotheses are thus supported.
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Among high tech firms, the odds ratio of achieving
revenue is highest after just one radical pivot, whereas
among the general cohort the odds ratio is highest after
three radical pivots. Among low tech firms, the odds
ratio is highest after four radical pivots, but the second
order effect among low tech firms is not statistically
significant because the logit curve is relatively flat and
insensitive to the number of pivots.

5. Discussion, Limitations, and Future
Research
This study empirically confirms the inverted-U
relationship between performance (probability of
achieving revenue) and radical pivots (change in NAICS
code) among startups. Being longitudinal the study was
able to track the pivoting history of each participating
firm and compute the running sum of pivots. The higher
sensitivity to pivots (greater logit coefficient magnitude)
among high tech firms may be due to factors previously
discussed. Because high tech firms operate in greater
market uncertainty than low tech firms, they have more
to benefit from an initial course correction, which would
explain the steep improvement in performance between
zero and one pivot. At the same time, too many pivots
penalize high tech firms more severely than low tech
firms, possibly because the former are more dependent
on being perceived by stakeholders as consistent in such
uncertainty.

High tech and low tech firms were found to differ
not only in the sensitivity to pivoting, but also in the
optimum number of radical pivots. The weaker penalty
for “over-pivoting” among low-tech firms may explain
their higher optimum number of pivots.
There are several limitations to this study. The first
is that the KFS does not reveal multiple pivots that may
have occurred between annual follow-ups, but only if at
least one occurred. A second limitation is the proxy
used for radical pivot: a change in the self-reported sixdigit NAICS code. One could argue that a firm could
undergo a critical pivot without incurring a change to its
NAICS, although an NAICS change would remain
being a strong indicator of radical pivot.
This exploratory research can be continued along
several directions. The model can be expanded to
control for factors that may contribute to sensitivity to
pivoting, such as a firm’s reliance on investors. Very
radical pivots (e.g., a sector change involving the two
most significant digits of the NACIS code) can be
distinguished from less radical pivots. Moreover, it is
possible that different types of pivots occur with
different outcomes at different stages of a startup. Blank
[15] calls these stages the concept, development,
working prototype, and mature product stages. It is
possible that hesitation to pivot may increase the longer
a firm has been in existence as the firm is more invested
in its expertise. It also may be more risk averse, or
display more persistence, extreme devotion, or
overconfidence.

Table 3. Logistic regression results.

pivot

Logit

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

1.508
1.677
1.518
1.033
0.220
-0.920
-2.387

Odds
Ratio
4.517
5.348
4.565
2.809
1.246
0.399
0.092

All Firms
Coeff
Stat Sig
0.219
p<0.01
-0.041
p<0.05
Logit
1.323
1.502
1.599
1.616
1.552
1.407
1.180

Odds
Ratio
3.754
4.489
4.950
5.033
4.720
4.082
3.255

Low Tech
Coeff
Stat Sig
0.209
p<.001
-0.024
N/S
Logit
1.295
1.480
1.618
1.708
1.751
1.746
1.693
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